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What has become known variously as the "realism debate," the "expres-
sionism debate" and the "Brecht-Lukacs literary debate" originated during the 
1930s and is still very much alive today. Though the debate has benefited from 
the participation of some non-Marxists, it has been primarily a broad 
discussion of disagreements among Marxist artists and theorists about the 
values and characteristics of classical, bourgeois and socialist art.1 Bertolt 
Brecht and Georg Lukacs, who eventually emerged as the major figures of the 
debate and the rallying points for others, strongly disagreed initially on the 
question of the aesthetic effect. Lukacs appeared to continue the tradition of 
the largely affective critical approaches of Aristotle, Lessing, Kant and Hegel, 
while Brecht, who came to Marxism shortly before the debate started and was 
just then in the midst of developing his theory of alienation, summarily rejected 
any emotion-based aesthetic. From today's perspective, with the life-work of 
both Brecht and Lukacs completed, it is possible to make an analysis that 
shows where the two leading Marxist aestheticians differ, where they augment 
each other and just how strong their affinity is. Such an analysis can also 
illuminate Brecht's widely accepted but unexamined claim to anti-Aristotle-
anism. 
Emotion and Empathy-the Origins of Brecht's Alienation Effect 
Brecht's negative reaction to the dominant theories of his time suggests 
that he perceives them to be more uniform than they are. He calls all 
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theories prior to his own "Aristotlean" and all theatre before him "dramatic," 
as if identical. His generalized negative reaction suggests that he has read 
existing theoretical works only superficially and that he blames them for 
stimulating the practices of the bourgeois theatre, manifested in its melo-
dramas with their pandering of the emotions of fear, hate and anger; its 
sentimental dramas with their tears, teary smiles and demand for empathy; and 
its operas and serious dramas with their reinforcement of the notion of 
"eternal" and "unalterable" human nature. He finds the "Aristotlean" play 
"essentially static," showing the world only "as it is,"2 and the "dramatic theatre" 
hopelessly mired in emotions which enslave the spectator's mind. Those few 
artists whom he sees as partly or significantly different from this include G.B. 
Shaw, Wedekind, Kaiser, some other expressionists and Piscator and his 
political theatre. 
Although Brecht's earliest plays (Baal, Drums In the Night, etc.) are not 
radically different from the kind of theatre he criticizes, he begins thinking 
about the idea of the epic theatre very early in his career, sometime before his 
exposure to Marx's writings. In a 1926 interview with Walter Benjamin,3 he 
already identifies "empathy" as the emotion the theatre must be rid of and 
discusses his epic theatre as the concept that will bring "reason" to dominance 
on the stage. He believes that in the theatre (and in other arts) it is the 
Aristotlean sense of "imitation" that is responsible for strong emotional 
(empathie) identification between characters and audiences. In this kind of 
theatre the audience is not a "number of individuals," but a "collective 
individual, a mob, which must and can be reached only through emotions."4 
Brecht's knowledge of the Poetics appears to be hearsay. Consequently, 
he is often unfair to Aristotle. He thinks Aristotle invented the three unities 
and seems to believe that Horace's Ars Poetica is very close to Aristotle's text. 
He blames Aristotle for allegedly recommending the stimulation of tears with 
tears and "conquering the reader's breast," which Horace gives as advice to 
would-be playwrights.5 He rightly calls "barbaric" certain recommendations of 
Cicero and Horace for the elicitation of tears in actors and audiences, but he 
wrongly associates the origin of such practices with Aristotle. Still, despite his 
questionable and overly generalized reading of Aristotle's theory, Brecht is 
accurate in his observation that the western theatre he most often witnessed, 
is heavily influenced by the ideals of Aristotle and Greek tragedy and it is a 
theatre of "imitation," "catharsis" and "universal" characters and truths. So the 
"dramatic theatre's" spectator when he says, "Just like me-It's only natural-It'll 
never change," speaks in this spirit of "universality;" when he says, "That is 
great art; it all seems the most obvious thing in the world," he expresses his 
appreciation of the perfect "imitation" of reality as he knows it; and when he 
exclaims, "I weep when they weep," he becomes a helpless victim of empathy 
(Einfuhlung) and "catharsis."6 
Brecht asserts that those among his contemporaries whom he sees as 
heirs to Aristotlean criticism "discredit learning by presenting it as not 
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enjoyable." They want to put the "enjoyable" into a category entirely separate 
from "learning" and argue that "emotions, instincts, impulses are generally . . . 
deeper, more eternal . . . than ideas."7 But Brecht disagrees, saying that 
emotions are "not common to all humanity," not unalterable, instincts are not 
infallible and impulses are not uncontrollable. Those who believe they are, 
make a sharp distinction between entertainment and instruction. They distrust 
reason and hold that only emotions are compatible with entertainment in the 
arts. Opposing this view diametrically to the last few years of his life, Brecht 
believes that reason and learning, not emotions, are truly compatible with 
entertainment in the theatre. 
To remedy the situation, Brecht proposes his concept of the epic theatre. 
The part of that concept which is designed specifically to break the strangle-
hold of emotions on theatre audiences is the device of the "alienation effect" 
(Verfremdungseffekt). The V-effect, because it is applicable to playwriting, 
acting and all other aspects of theatre production, has become known at once 
as the most essential and the most easily demonstrable characteristic of the 
epic theatre. Dominating though its presence may be in an epic theatre 
production, the V-effect is not meant to be part of the aesthetic effect itself. 
It is a device used to ensure a certain kind of aesthetic effect. It is a means, 
not an end. 
The idea of the alienation effect entered Brecht's mind long before he 
gave it a specific name. In 1920 he wrote this in his diary: "Once I get my 
hooks on a theatre I shall hire 2 clowns. They will perform in the interval and 
pretend to be spectators. They will bandy opinions about the play and about 
the members of the audience. Make bets on the outcome."8 While this kind 
of device has its origins in the ancient Greek festivals and the commedia del 
Varte, it is quite a contrast to the opera and dramatic theatres of young 
Brecht's days. The idea indicates Brecht's search for interesting (entertaining) 
intellectual stimulation in the theatre. 
According to Willett, the term "alienation effect" was taken by Brecht 
from Russian formalist Victor Shklovsky's "Priem Ostrannenija" which literally 
means "a device for making strange."9 Brecht visited Moscow during the early 
1930s and saw a performance of the Chinese Mei Lan-fang's company. The 
term entered his aesthetic vocabulary after this, when he wrote "Alienation 
Effects in Chinese Acting." Shklovsky's term, however, which he discusses in 
his 1917 book Iskusstvo kak priyom (Art as Technique), seems to have a 
connotation close to "distancing," different from Brecht's Verfremdung which 
means making the familiar look strange. In Brecht's practice alienation 
amounts to providing the audience new ways to look at old things. 
In some sense Shklovsky wants what Brecht wants: to increase the length 
of perception and to make objects unfamiliar. Shklovsky also wants, however, 
to make perception more difficult, because for him the "process of perception 
is an aesthetic end in itself."10 Brecht does not share this objective. He wants 
to eliminate difficulties, not to create them. The difficulties to perception are 
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created by blind empathie bonds between the art work and the spectator. He 
tries to use the V-effect as a "barrier to empathy." A representation which 
alienates in this way, Brecht says, "allows us to recognize its subject, but at the 
same time makes it seem unfamiliar."11 It is crucially important to note here 
that Brecht wants to keep the subject recognizable. In Shklovsky's sense and 
in the majority of "modernist" art works, the defamiliarization (the estrange-
ment from reality) is so drastic that the subject is unrecognizably hidden or 
distorted. 
Brecht's use of alienation is also different from what he calls "old V-
effects," which "remove the object represented from the spectator's grasp."12 
The new alienation effects, he says, are not quite so radical. In fact, they are 
designed to achieve the opposite goal: to allow us to grasp socially conditioned 
phenomena by freeing them from that "sense of familiarity" which hides them 
from our perception. But not all "old" alienation effects are ineffective. He 
is inspired, for example, by the alienation devices used in Breughel's paintings. 
Based on these and other artists' use of the V-effect, Brecht concludes that the 
technique is important in all arts for effective communication. 
In Formalism and Marxism, Tony Bennett interprets the objective of 
formalism as wanting to shatter the concept of "directly lived and experienced" 
reality.13 On the surface this seems close to the views of both Brecht and 
Lukacs, but Bennett is not talking about achieving this through the technique 
of alienation. He borrows Ortega y Gasset's term "dehumanization" to apply 
to this formalist process of shattering direct reality. This may be meant as a 
way of improving human aesthetic perception and insight, but it does not fit 
with either Lukacs's or Brecht's idea of the aesthetic effect. They both want 
to preserve the anthropocentric quality of art and always to view man as a 
social being. Brecht makes it emphatically clear that with the help of the V-
effect he wants to enable the spectator to "criticize constructively from a social 
point of view."14 
The Brechtian alienation involves the play's structure, the ordering and 
interrelationship of its scenes, the exposition, the language, the way the conflict 
is shaped through the dialogue, and how the contradictions are pointed. It 
involves the non-illusionistic, sometimes self-consciously cerebral use of the 
scenic, lighting and musical elements in the production. But perhaps the best 
illustration of its estranging and "confrontational" aspects is in its approach to 
acting. Brecht expects his actor to stand apart from his character by means of 
such methods as referring to the character's actions in past tense ("he said") 
and describing the essential attitude of the character at the time ("he said 
meekly") which make the actor consciously aware of the particular "social gest" 
that is to be created for that moment or scene. This "confrontation" between 
actor and character, this simultaneous presentation of the character as subject 
and object enables the spectator to see his "wishes not merely fulfilled but also 
criticized."15 The spectator is not only set in the character's place as in 
"dramatic" theatre, he is also set to face the character, in a challenging, critical 
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position. So that when Brecht says that the spectator should see himself "not 
as the subject but as the object," he really means that he should see himself as 
both the subject and the object. 
What is involved in the V-effect is that the "human social incidents" are 
labelled as "something striking, something that calls for explanation . . . not to 
be taken for granted, not just natural."16 Whether the effect is called striking, 
jolting or discomforting, its aim is to bring the spectator to a state of 
heightened awareness of a certain aspect of human social reality. The 
formalist "dehumanization of reality" idea is more in tune with the objectives 
of science which must altogether eliminate the human, emotional element from 
its investigation. Brecht is only seeking to break through the haze of illusion 
which impairs perception; to find a way out of emotional bondage in the 
theatre and pave the way toward a sharper, more intellectual, more open-mind-
ed vision. 
Marx says in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 that the 
human being is larger than his thought. At the time Brecht is formulating his 
concept of the alienation effect, he regards the activity and stimulation of the 
human mind so singularly important that he seems to disagree with Marx. He 
speaks derisively not only about empathy, but emotions in general and certainly 
of the Aristotlean notion of catharsis. 
Lukacs: from Emotions to Ethics 
The young Brecht's position thus is quite different from Lukacs's idea of 
the aesthetic effect.17 Lukacs makes the Aristotlean catharsis the center of his 
definition, thereby insisting on an emotional core in the aesthetic experience, 
though undoubtedly he uses the term catharsis in a meaning different from 
Aristotle's. Catharsis to him means a moving and shaking effect that purges 
our passions and readies our souls for the reception and acceptance of the 
morally good. In drama it means that the spectator lives through the hero's 
struggle. Still, empathy (Einfuhlung) and illusion have little or no role in 
Lukacs's concept of the aesthetic effect either. He argues that the anthro-
pomorphic reflection that requires illusion is religion and not art, because 
religion demands absolute belief in its images and symbols. Empathy, on the 
other hand is a common occurrence in everyday life. If empathy dominates, 
then the aesthetic experience is dragged down to the level of ordinary life. 
Lukacs passionately opposes the Nietzschean "Dionysiac intoxication" concept 
which he sees as nothing other than an extreme form of the empathie 
response. 
That Lukacs opposes extreme or exclusively emotional response as the 
primary objective of the aesthetic effect, that he would not unconditionally 
accept Lessing's remark that "the only unpardonable fault of the tragic poet is 
this, that he leaves us cold,"18 does not mean that he joins in a platonic 
opposition to pleasure. An examination of his theories reveals that, in fact, 
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he considers pleasure to be an integral part of the aesthetic experience. It is 
not an exaggeration to say, he writes, that "art perhaps never would have come 
into being if pleasure were not an important, even vital, social constituent of 
the life of man." The human being responds to phenomena of life positively 
or negatively "within the outlines of pleasure" and this fact is "crucial in the 
origin of every art."19 
Still, the ultimate effect of the artistic experience for Lukacs is not 
emotional but ethical in nature. He writes extensively about the deep 
relationship between aesthetics and ethics, which, he believes, reveals the fact 
that "a truly profound aesthetic development is not possible without regard to 
moral problems."20 He enthusiastically accepts Keats' poetic expression: 
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty." Yet he believes that human emotions play a 
significant role in arriving at the final effect. The experience that results in the 
final ethical effect has three parts: (1) the recipient's inner state in the 
"before" of the effect, (2) the cathartic effect "during" the reception of the art 
work, and (3) the "after" period of the experience. 
The receiver comes to the art work not as "tabula rasa," but as a "whole 
man of life" loaded down with impressions, experiences and ideas. He brings 
with him his personal worries and desires. But only journalistic and rhetorical 
works address this whole man of life directly. The true art work endeavors 
to create its "own world" and break into the recipient's soul-complex, 
suspending his concern with the petty elements of his personal life and 
transforming him into a sense of "man's wholeness" whose concern is the 
destiny of humanity. This idea is similar to Kant's, but with Lukacs it is not 
idealistically based; it does not rely on the dualistic notion of the phenomenal 
and noumenal world. Here there is no need to transcend this world. There 
is only a need to transcend one's petty, personal concerns and to see one's 
future as a part of the future of humanity. 
The aesthetic effect itself, the recipient's experience "during" the taking-in 
of the art work, is not purely emotional even though it has catharsis at its core. 
Lukacs is as skeptical of merely emotional artistic effects as Brecht is. He 
accepts Lessing's definition of catharsis as "the transformation of passions into 
virtuous habits," and finds it applicable not only to tragedy, but to all of the 
arts. The moving, purging effect provided by the arts "causes us to become 
better human beings," to develop in us "the readiness for the morally good." 
Yet he does not believe that the "moral problems" presented by the art work 
(whether timely or universal) should be expected to be solved during the 
presentation of the work. "The problems remain problems, they 'merer/ 
broaden man's horizons and reveal conditions and consequences otherwise 
doomed to oblivion."21 The experience which changes the "whole man of life" 
into "man's wholeness," fills the individual with "new and freshly seen contents" 
and forces him/her to take in this world with "rejuvenated senses and 
thinking."22 
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The permeation of the individual by a sense of wholeness and member-
ship in ongoing humanity is only temporary. "After" the intense cathartic 
experience, the recipient goes back to the problems of his/her personal life. 
But as Lukacs's "great river of life" metaphor illustrates, s/he takes into his/her 
own veins the cleansing effect of the art-work. It is here, in the "after" phase, 
that the aesthetic effect proper overflows into ethics. The cultural, attitudinal 
change brought about this way is slow and usually imperceptible, but 
frequently, a "single art-work may bring a complete turnabout in a man's life."23 
Whatever the degree of change, the aesthetic effect is indirect, because the 
cathartic effect directly touches only a person's sense of wholeness, modifying 
individual interests only through that cleansing filter. In Lukacs's perception 
of the whole process, life feeds into art (the river branches off) and art feeds 
back into life (the cleaner waters rejoin the river) unendingly, so that both life 
and art are constantly enriched. 
The DifTerences-Lukacs's Critique of Brecht 
From this point of view, Lukacs's critique of Brecht's notion of the 
aesthetic effect begins with the rhetorical dimension of Brecht's early work. 
The rhetorical elements in the art-work address not the individual's sense of 
wholeness, but the whole person of everyday life, because they speak to 
practical, timely problems. What should happen in the "after" phase, happens 
"during" the reception of the work. The cathartic effect is prevented and the 
experience is not aesthetic in nature. Of course, Lukacs admits that a certain 
amount of rhetoric can and does exist in art-works without interfering with 
their greatness. But aesthetic greatness in such cases occurs despite and not 
because of the rhetoric. 
Brecht's V-effect not only endeavors consciously to prevent catharsis, it 
also changes the language of his art, Lukacs argues, from sensuous to abstract. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to verify that the most rhetorical of Brecht's plays 
(e.g. The Mother, Saint Joan of the Stockyards) are also the most abstract in 
their language. This, Lukacs would argue, not only keeps out emotions, it also 
prevents the creation of effective, sensuous characterizations. But the main 
idea of the V-effect, Lukacs knows, is not just to eliminate emotions. The 
main idea is to make it possible for the spectator (without empathie involve-
ment) to recognize the object in the art-work and also to see it as strange. 
Lukacs, though using different terms, agrees with this objective, but does not 
believe that the imposition of unintegrated alienation devices is necessary to 
achieve it. The tension between subject and object is already inherent in the 
dramatic form, he argues, referring for example to Chekhov's brilliant portrayal 
of the conflict between his characters' subjective intentions and objective 
directions. If this is what Brecht wants through alienation, says Lukacs, he is 
knocking on open doors. 
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Brecht contends that his epic theatre with its alienation devices is 
necessary, because the "dramatic" theatre portrays the structure of society as 
something that cannot be changed or influenced by the spectators in the 
theatre. If we think of Lukacs's metaphorical description of the effective 
interplay between life and art, we realize that he must disagree. But he also 
agrees. Theatre (art) in his view does influence the direction of society, but 
only indirectly through ethical changes in human beings. It does not, nor is it 
usually capable of causing changes by directly addressing current social 
problems and persuading the spectators to make the political or economic 
changes that seem necessary. 
The Common Grounds and the Changes in Brecht's Views 
There is much, however, that Lukacs finds sound and reasonable in 
Brecht's ideas behind the V-effect. He finds it appealing that Brecht wants to 
destroy not only the illusions (magic) of the theatre, but also the illusions, false 
hopes and false consciousness in the spectators. Brecht wants an alert 
audience that cannot be fooled by cliches and the facade of reality. The 
facade, the surface of reality, the "familiar" that Brecht wants to break through 
is the same as Lukacs's concept of the "appearance" of everyday life which 
tends to hide things and confuse the casual observer. When Lukacs looks to 
the art-work for its ability to get beneath the appearance and create the typical 
and the essential, he is in complete agreement with Brecht who wants to 
enable the spectator through the art-work to see social relationships in a 
familiar context but in an entirely new ("strange") light. Though some of their 
means are different, they both want art to hurdle the obstacles on the way to 
the truth. 
Mittenzwei holds, as do most commentators on Brecht's aesthetics, that 
Brecht was a "great opponent of Aristotleanism" and that their views on the 
role of catharsis in the aesthetic experience was what set Brecht and Lukacs 
farthest apart.24 But Brecht's position cannot be considered truly 
anti-Aristotlean. His is a negative reaction to an over-simplified aesthetic 
concept he calls Aristotleanism. He never gives us anything near to a complete 
critique of Aristotle's Poetics, nor an indication that he read the entire 
document. He talks only about a few aspects of Aristotle's theory (what he 
does not like) and on those he partly contradicts himself and partly changes his 
mind over the years. We have seen that in fact, despite his theoretical 
protestation to the contrary, in much of his own dramaturgy and in some of his 
reactions to bad productions of his plays (e.g. his critique of the New York 
production of The Mother), he insists on the causal-sequential structuring of 
the incidents. Such structuring of the plot (story) is the quintessential 
Aristotlean dramaturgical principle. Furthermore, starting about 1939 with his 
criticism of certain of the rhetorical and political aspects of Piscator's 
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theatre,25 he begins to work toward striking a balance between entertainment 
and didacticism on the one hand and reason and emotion on the other. 
In light of this, when Lukacs alleges that Brecht, despite his justly 
suspicious attitude toward emotionalism, manages to hold on to the "seed of 
catharsis,"26 he is not far off the mark. Not only do Brecht's late plays tend to 
evoke a cathartic effect (sometimes to Brecht's displeasure as in the case of the 
ending of Mother Courage), but Brecht's theoretical position also shows a 
significant shift. In a 1941 diary entry he expresses his wish to free himself 
from the warring opposition of reason and emotion.27 In later writings, though 
still skeptical about such things as the "class basis" of emotions,28 he continues 
to work toward the reconciliation of the two. In 1949 he denies that epic 
theatre ever proclaimed the slogan "Reason this side, Emotion (feeling) that." 
He goes on to say that epic theatre "by no means renounces emotion," in fact 
it tries to arouse in its spectators certain emotions such as "the sense of justice, 
the urge to freedom and righteous anger." The critical attitude that the epic 
theatre wants to awaken in its audience, he concludes, "cannot be passionate 
enough."29 
To see clearly the late Brecht's view of emotions in the theatre, we need 
to look at the ideas expressed in A Short Organum For the Theatre and Der 
Messingkauf. In the Short Organum he is trying to lay the theoretical 
foundations of a theatre designed for the masses that is masterfully entertain-
ing, critical in approach and ethical in aim. For the achievement of such 
objectives he finds the existing theatre completely inadequate. If we want to 
know why, he says, all we have to do is to observe the behavior of the audience 
at one of the performances. They are tense (unless they are exhausted, 
probably from boredom), they do not communicate and they generally behave 
as if asleep or hypnotized. "Their eyes are open, but they stare rather than 
see, just as they listen rather than hear. They look at the stage as if in a 
trance."30 And what is responsible for bringing on this state of zombie-like 
behavior? Empathy. Not all emotions are undesirable in the theatre, only 
empathy. 
It is a mistake to conclude, he writes in a letter to his friend Mordecai 
Gorelik in 1944, that the epic theatre is against all emotions. "Reason and 
emotion," he states categorically, "can't be divided."31 The epic theatre is 
different from the conventional theatre in that it tries to examine emotions, not 
merely to stimulate them. Still, one emotion, empathy, because of its 
paralyzing effect on the senses and minds of the spectators must be eliminated 
from the theatre. "Does getting rid of empathy mean getting rid of every 
emotional element?" asks the Actor in Der Messingkauf. "No, no," comes the 
unhesitating answer of the Philosopher. "Neither the public nor the actor must 
be stopped from taking part emotionally; the representation of emotions must 
not be hampered, nor must the actors use of emotions be frustrated. Only one 
of many possible sources of emotion needs to be left unused, or at least 
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treated as a subsidiary source-empathy."32 This finally makes Brecht's position 
on emotion and reason in a theatre performance clear. 
Does such a shift in Brecht's views on the role of emotions finally bring 
him into complete agreement with Lukacs's idea of the aesthetic effect? They 
both favor an art whose ultimate effect on human beings is ethical. They agree 
that both reason and emotion play a significant role in the aesthetic experience 
and the obstacles they both want to eliminate are mostly associated with 
empathy. They both fight against empathy. Even Mittenzwei admits that 
Lukacs is an even stronger opponent of empathy than Brecht, who never 
wavers on this. The appropriate question then is: Do they define empathy the 
same way? Not according to Mittenzwei who believes that for Brecht, to the 
end of his life, "Aristotlean cathartic effect means primarily empathy."33 But 
the stimulation of empathy is not an Aristotlean principle, it is only that in 
Brecht's vocabulary. Though it is very difficult for scholars to agree on the 
meaning of Aristotle's cryptic definition of catharsis, it is quite evident from a 
reading of the entire text of the Poetics that he does not mean empathy by it. 
Aristotle's catharsis, the purging of emotions, is the "final cause" of tragedy, 
brought on at the end by the resolution of the action. The empathy Brecht 
dislikes is a strong emotional identification with characters and objects 
throughout the performance which keeps the spectators from making 
independent critical judgements about the decisions and actions of those 
characters. 
Mittenzwei asserts that what is empathy for Brecht is "re-living" for 
Lukacs, but his argument is not supportable. The empathy that Lukacs 
opposes consists of immersion in the vicarious experiencing of another's 
feelings whose "objective essence is either unknown or is a matter of 
indifference to us" and which, we fully understand, has no ultimate impact on 
our lives.34 The "art-works" (especially novels, plays and films) which stimulate 
this kind of feeling are trivial and escapist. They do not reflect the world as 
reflection is understood in Lukacs's theory of realism. Experiencing a 
performance of a Faust, Oedipus, or a Hamlet, does not call forth this kind of 
feeling. We "re-live" or "live through" the heroes' struggles in such dramas 
realizing that the objective significance of their choices and actions does have 
a meaning for our lives. 
For Lukacs, catharsis in art is "that moving and shaking effect, that 
convulsion which is provided by tragedy, comedy, the novel, the good painting, 
the good statue and the musical creation, that purging of our passions" which 
"causes us to become better human beings than we were" and develops in us 
"the readiness for the morally good."35 Though Aristotle writes only about 
tragedy, this definition of catharsis is reasonably consistent with the Poetics. 
The late Brecht, who calls emotion and reason in art inseparable, could not 
disagree with Lukacs's implication that without emotion there is no tragedy and 
no great art. Insofar as Lukacs's concept of catharsis is not an endorsement 
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of empathy or emotionalism and does not strip reason of its rightful role in art, 
it is fully consistent with the position of the late Brecht. 
It would be going too far to say that Brecht "abandons" his earlier position 
on the aesthetic effect, even though that is just the term he uses in the 
"prologue" of his Short Organum. He abandons only his dryly rhetorical 
"learning play" concept, not the whole idea of a cerebral theatre. He becomes 
more concerned about sensuousness and enjoyment than before, but he makes 
it clear that the things that create enjoyment in art are: the understanding of 
reality, the justification of world view, the reinforcement of the will to live and 
the perfection of the aesthetic reflection.36 He definitely "mellows," as Willett 
puts it, regarding his early rigid insistence on the disruption of the spectator's 
emotional involvement by means of the alienation effect. He still holds most 
of the ideas that gave birth to the concept of the epic theatre, but is now 
working toward a more advanced "dialectic" theatre. "Dialectic" theatre is 
never fully defined, but it would presumably accommodate the late changes in 
his aesthetics. It does not seem to include "Verfremdung" or alienation, for no 
mention is made of it in a late glossary of important terms.37 These changes 
lead some of his contemporaries to think that he has become a conventional 
dramatist. In an interview with Brecht in 1949, East-German playwright 
Friedrich Wolf suggests that Mother Courage "would have been more effective" 
if the mother had made, or given at least a hint of, a realization of her 
mistakes at the end. But, in response, Brecht makes it clear that he still wants 
nothing to do with the traditional character discovery of conventional tragedy. 
What Mother Courage learns matters little; what the audience learns by 
observing her is of the greatest importance.38 
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